What are you, exactly?

[Rigwyn]

So here's a fun question that's kind a simple at face value, but gets a little more tricky as you dig into it.

What are you, exactly?

If you cut off an arm or a leg, you are still you.

If you could cut off everything from the stomach down and your arms, nose and ears, you would still be you, right? If so, then you are not these parts.

If with the aid of advanced life support equipment, you could cut off everything from the neck down and still live, you would still be you, right? There would be no loss of self...

And if someone else could have their head attached to your now headless body, they would still be themselves.. they would not be you. Right?

[Caraick]

Thanks for bringing philosophy into it, Rigwyn. 

Theseus' Ship: If an old ship is brought back to shore, and every last part of it replaced with new timber, sails, and rigging, is it still the same ship?

If Dr. Xavier's consciousness occupies another person's body, is that person now Dr. Xavier? It hits on the most fundamental concepts of where we draw our identity from.  If we say it's merely something physical, such as the quality of our race being bipedal, there are a thousand examples akin to the ones that Rigwyn's brought up that seem to dig at a physical grounding of identity. 

So where must the self be?

[Rigwyn]

I like the ship analogy, Caraick

Well, if we say that the person is their thoughts and the brain is just a mere appliance like a lamp or television, then that seems to solve the problem for a while, but then you could argue that without the brain , there are no thoughts just as the light from a light bulb depends on the current and filament.

So say you wanted to dissect this problem by pausing the body and mind using some freaky alien technology, making a perfect clone of the person, an then copying their mind into the clone.

If you now un-paused the clone, would the "self" or "me" be transferred to it? Would you suddenly wake up in this new body?

What if both bodies were un-paused at the same time? Would there now be two instances of the same "me" or would you have two different "me"s ?

[bilbous]

I am the bacteria that inhabits this fleshly robot.

[Rigwyn]

It kind of makes you wonder just how small the self is once you chop away all the extraneous crapola. Are we nothing more than a "this" pointer or a bacteria or growth on a pile of flesh?

Also, is wiping out someone's memories ( say through electroshock therapy  ( I use the term therapy lightly here)) roughly equivalent to killing them if you draw self from one's mind, self awareness and memories?

[Caraick]

One theory of identity posits that our identity is formed by the memories and experiences that we've seen in our lives.  That our self is defined through a collection of experiences and images from life that constitute our identity. 

The easy objection to that, however, is memory loss or diseases that cause similar effects.

It does, I think, however, point towards a non-physical basis for human identity.  Towards something less material.

[Rigwyn]

Perhaps its a mistake to assume that the self is singular. An onion for example, it not any one layer. It's all the layers.

If you change the "I am" self reference to a "we are" self reference, then you survive the mutilation in the thought experiment lab, no?

ie.

"We are the thoughts, memories, processes and fleshy things that are collectively referred to as Rigwyn."

To build on that, if you refer to yourself as "we are", might it also be logical to expand your sense of identity by including fellow people and other life forms?

"we are the thoughts and fleshy things that are collectively called the human race."
"We are life"
"We are the planet"
"We are the universe"

[Caraick]

If we assume the self is plural, then the finger that is chopped off by an errant knife is also, just as much, 'me'.  As is the blood that lies on the ground thereafter.  Problematic, I think.

Especially when extrapolations are made to identify the sense of self as the entirety of the Universe.  In that case, Rigwyn is just as much Caraick as Caraick is Rigwyn.  The names themselves are meaningless, if all is one.  Again, problematic.

[Rigwyn]

Problematic if you need to identify things as singular, yes.

As for the finger, when it's chopped off, the cells in it are still very much alive. Same goes for the blood on the floor. Therefore, we are made up of not just one "life" but billions of tiny,co-dependent lives. We are a collection of living organism and colonies of living bacteria, are we not?

[Caraick]

Our bodies may be, surely. 

But I don't think we want to call Rigwyn's finger laying bloody on the ground Rigwyn.  Or else you may get eaten by the dog. And I don't think Rigwyn likes getting eaten by dogs.

[bilbous]

Another theory is that the self is just the cross-chatter interference of the electrical signals passing through the neurons.

[Volki]

One theory of identity posits that our identity is formed by the memories and experiences that we've seen in our lives.  That our self is defined through a collection of experiences and images from life that constitute our identity. 

The easy objection to that, however, is memory loss or diseases that cause similar effects.

That's not an objection. That is an addition. Our identity is formed by who we are biologically and our experiences.

When you lose an arm, you have lost a part of your self. Your body is not just some tool. It is you, and your brain recognizes that. In your mind, you have an image of yourself which allows you to orient your body and perform actions without constantly having to look at your body parts to make sure they are doing what you want them to do. When you lose a part of this map, you don't lose the map. This creates the phenomenon called a phantom limb. The fact that you have lost a part of something that is recognized by your brain to be a part of itself means you have lost a part of your own self.

[Caraick]

Sounds like you're arguing for a more physical foundation for the concept of identity, then. 


I think one might argue that, when you lose a body part, your personality will change, but you are still very much the same person in an ontological sense.   If I transferred Rigwyn's consciousness to a computer, somehow, when his body expired, would he not still be the same person? By your argument, he would cease to by Rigwyn at all, once his body has died.  Are not quadruple amputees still the same person as before?

[Volki]

I don't believe they would be the same. Even their personalities will change after something so drastic. If we lived in a world where limbs could be replaced, the psychological effect would be much less, possibly nonexistent, but you still would have lost a part of yourself.

Our bodies are basically a collection of organisms living together. Every cell has become so dependent on the others, though, that we are now categorized as our own organism.

I personally do not believe that consciousness is separate from our physical bodies. I believe that a consciousness inhabits a body, but that it cannot really be defined as "a" consciousness. The body is a vessel for consciousness to experience the world. This could be through humans, dogs, or flies. The level that the consciousness is able to experience the world is based on the biological make-up of the body it inhabits. But once a body ceases to exist, the consciousness does not retain any memories.

So, I don't believe that each person owns a consciousness. But I believe that consciousness allows us to truly be aware through inhabiting our bodies.

[Eonwind]

Interesting.
Albeit you all seem to be irresistibly drawn to define identity by scientific (or pseudo scientific) means.
Since this is a philosophic matter my answer will be philosophic.

I am always becoming.

This means that none of the parts that make myself can be changed without consequences. If any of my parts is chopped away, including the mind, the soul or any of my body part I am no more the same person I was before.

Speaking about the concept of "we" as opposed to "self" I think the sheer fact alone that we are able to conceive ourselves as a "standalone" identity make each of us a "self" in it's own right, however we could never ever be what we are if what is outside of us would not exist, so we are surely part of "we".

In the end I think we are "I" and "we" at the same time and the two identities cannot be easily separed without making the other meaningless.

Unfortunately a lot of persons are not really aware of the "we are" concept and live their lives just like it would not exist.